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i. Executive Summary 
 
 
This paper looks into the logical framework of the microfinance institutions’ (MFIs) 
scaling up process, particularly conversion from non-governmental organization 
towards formal financial institution. 
 
After introducing the subject, in the Second section the paper offers an overview of 
the microfinance environment worldwide, with particular emphasis on the 
institutional variety in providing microfinance services, trends in microfinance 
industry and rationale for conversion. 
 
Third section introduces Opportunity International as a global microfinance coalition 
and its nine Eastern European implementing partners. Brief overview of each of the 
nine MFIs has been offered, altogether with their formal, institutional status and 
their performance in the past 6 years. 
 
Forth section focuses on the process of conversion that has been developed for the 
MFIs in question. As they are belonging to different economic and legal 
environments, the initial road map offered is just a framework for action, while 
each of the partners were free to undertake (or not) their own path towards 
achieving their mission and vision. 
 
Conversion implications, key issues and debates followed by the lessons learned 
have been part of the Section five. Although not an easy task due to the differences, 
initial classification of the challenges for the road map has been made. 
 
The last section concludes the paper, comparing the theoretical and empirical 
findings of the research.
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ii. Methodology and Terminology Challenges 
 
Although to some extent relaxed, there is still ongoing political debate on the sense 
of conversion of non-governmental organizations into regulated or formal financial 
institutions. The perpetuation of the debate implies that there are no widely 
accepted, accredited or recognized methods on how to assess the rationale for 
conversion. 
 
Having this understood as unquestionable, i.e. that the argumentation in favor of 
conversion cannot be successfully objected, the second level of methodological 
dilemmas draws closer: how to measure the successfulness of the conversion, so to 
recommend a road map? Which of the performance figures to measure: client 
outreach - number of clients and portfolio size, loan portfolio quality, efficiency, 
sustainability, loan activity? Unfortunately, it was not possible to track two crucial 
indicators - neither the number of active savers nor the value of client savings - 
and that makes the interpretation of the pre and post conversion performance 
more approximate than accurate.  
 
In addition, as most of these performance figures increase with all partners, the 
next question is how to qualitatively and quantitatively interpret the level of 
increase? 
 
And finally, if we agree on the references on which the successful conversion is to 
be based, the third level of dilemmas appears: is it possible to classify or 
standardize the challenges, conversion implications and lessons learned, bearing in 
mind that the nine different microfinance institutions are constituted differently and 
operate under nine different countries therefore being subject to different legal 
provisions? 
 
Namely, it is very much possible that the social, legal and business environment 
influences MFI’s performance much more than the (un)successfully undertaken 
conversion. The same applies to the human resources/management in place 
engaged to go through the process. 
 
As for the terminology, that is another group of issues that deserve full attention.  
 
The first one is whether to make a distinction between the notions micro-credit and 
microfinance. In many works namely, these two terms have been used 
simultaneously. However, this paper distincts one from the other: so called 
development finance approach (highly subsidised or loss-making loans) has been 
considered a history, while micro-credit has been viewed as too narrow concept 
compared to microfinance that includes savings and insurance. 
 
Furthermore, in this paper formal and regulated financial institutions (FFI/RFI) are 
synonyms. In that respect, while microfinance institution (MFI) refers to any type 
of entity that provides microfinance services, FFI/RFI refers to some kind of entity 
being under supervision of the Central Bank. 
 
Another point of clarification is needed for the term conversion. Many authors use 
the term transformation, while some go further and name the whole process as 
commercialization. In that respect, while transformation might mislead or confuse 
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the reader (some MFIs use this term to refer to the impact on the client’s life), 
commercialization might not be very much welcome due to political reasons. So, 
the conversion as a term remain in use, as proposed in the very title of this paper. 
 
Of course, there are many other not conceptual and linguistic, but technical 
dilemmas concerning the terminology. For example, one of those is whether the 
finance companies are considered as FFIs, being under the supervision of Central 
Banks? As different regulatory frameworks treat them differently, in this paper they 
are rather seen as modus vivendi for operations than as fully regulated financial 
institutions that are to be made over with the conversion. 
 
Being close to the Central Bank’s supervision theme, it should be noted that the 
membership societies - namely credit unions or cooperatives have been considered 
as unregulated financial institutions, even knowing that there are cases of 
conversion from NGO to a co-operative.
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1. Introduction 
 
  
For more than three decades global microfinance services have been dominantly 
carried out by coalitions of non-for-profit organizations dedicated to providing 
opportunities for people in poverty to transform their lives through small and micro 
business loans, training, and financial services that enable them to develop and 
sustain income-generating and job-creating enterprises. Most of them have been 
motivated by their vision and mission that include outreach - number of clients 
served, financial viability - measured by the sustainability of their programs and 
transformational impact - measurable impact on the lives of their clients.  
 
Opportunity International (OI) is one of those global networks of microfinance 
institutions and funding partners dedicated to achieve a triple bottom line of 
outreach, financial viability and impact on their clients. In order to better achieve 
its goals, as many other global coalitions, several years ago OI made a strategic 
decision to focus on creating regulated (formal) rather than unregulated (informal) 
microfinance institutions, including conversion of those in existence, established 
through the years as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
 
The primary reason for this orientation has been to overcome legal barriers and 
governance limitations inherent in unregulated organizations which restrict 
outreach and access to capital. According to what the new concept affirmed, the 
significant outcomes should have been increased access to capital by regulated 
microfinance institutions in a form of wholesale debt, deposits and investor equity, 
the ability to offer additional services such as savings and insurance products, and 
the ability to attract investors that may not have otherwise participated. Given 
these advantages, it is projected that regulated microfinance institutions are able 
to reach far greater number of poor micro-entrepreneurs while reducing 
dependency on donated funds.  
 
“Microfinance in the 1990s has been marked by a major debate between two 
leading views: the financial systems approach and the poverty lending approach”, 
underlines Robinson (2001: 16). As the tendency for creating regulated financial 
institutions rather than historically preferred NGOs globally faces pro and contra 
argumentation, the project proposes the rationale for conversion to be based on 
the particular experiences, as well as on qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed 
performances of nine East European MFIs: PShM (Albania), Nachala (Bulgaria), 
NOA (Croatia), Moznosti (Macedonia), OBM (Montenegro), Inicjatywa Mikro 
(Poland), OMRO (Romania), FORA (Russia) and OIS (Serbia). Although all members 
of OI Network each of these microfinance entities belong to different social and 
legal environment, therefore being in different paths and phases of conversion. 
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2. Microfinance Environment Worldwide 
 
 
The emergence of microfinance institutions in developing countries has significantly 
multiplied over the past decades. A number of these institutions have been 
successful in providing credit and deposit services to the poor in low-income 
countries, facilitating poverty reduction strategies, supporting micro and small 
businesses, and expanding the financial frontier to include previously excluded 
clienteles. Innovative lending technologies, new financial products, appropriate 
pricing, and a general understanding of the challenges and opportunities for the 
microfinance sector have contributed to their success and expansion as well as to 
the substantial global political and financial support they have attracted. 
 
 
2.1. Global Microfinance Providers 
 
It is estimated that the microfinance industry overall serves only 32 million out of a 
potential 500 million (see Opportunity International, 2004) to 1.7 billion (Robinson, 
2001: 7) clients around the world. Based on these figures, there is still great unmet 
demand. However, this does not mean that there are not competitive environments 
within countries. In many large urban areas potential clients have many options of 
financial service providers. This is beneficial, because it forces the financial services 
to operate at levels of efficiency and customer service that will attract clients. 
The following table (see Opportunity International, 2004) shows how the 
microfinance networks compare on a global basis:
 Total 
number 
of 
clients 
Total 
loan 
portfolio 
(USD 
mil.) 
Average 
loan 
size 
(USD) 
Portfolio 
at risk 
Number 
of 
countries 
served 
Geographical 
focus 
10.0%ii ACCION 807,553i 442 548 
8.6%iii 
22 Africa, LA 
Opportunity 
International 
455,430iv 75.6 228 5.75% 28 Africa, Asia, 
EE, 
LA/Caribean 
Catholic 
Relief 
Services 
351,080v 28 153 NA 31 Africa, Asia, 
Europe, 
LA/Caribbean, 
the Middle 
East 
FINCA 227,388vi 32 255 NA 19 Africa, LA, 
NIS 
Freedom 
From Hunger 
217,948vii 13 72 NA 16 Africa, Asia, 
LA 
Women’s 
World 
Banking 
580,000viii 93 234 NA 31 Africa, Asia, 
LA, Europe, 
the Middle 
East 
World Relief 71,486ix 6 166 NA 10 Africa, Asia, 
Eurasia, 
LA/Caribean, 
US 
World Vision 220,000x 39.5 404 NA 42 Africa, Asia, 
EE, 
LA/Caribbean, 
Middle East 
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Interpreting the table and comparing other figures, regional distribution of 
microfinance providers’ operations appear as follows: 
 
• Africa – Opportunity International has been one of the strongest Networks 
in the region, with its main competition coming from PRIDE Africa and 
Freedom from Hunger. Recently ACCION entered the Africa market and is 
attracting a lot of donor attention; 
• Latin America – In the region as a whole ACCION’s affiliates serve 800,000 
clients. Women’s World Banking also has a wide presence in Latin America;  
• Asia – The region is dominated by the million plus clients of Grameen, 
BRAC and ASA in Bangladesh and BRI in Indonesia. In India, Women’s 
World Banking and SEWA reach significant number of clients; 
• Eastern Europe – Opportunity International is one of the two largest and 
best performing networks in the region, with IPC being the other. Since IPC 
focuses on a larger business size, OI is the dominant player in the small to 
micro sector.  
 
It is worth mentioning in this context that while MFIs are fairly common in most of 
the developing world, i.e. Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the transition 
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia remain a geographical frontier 
where microfinance appeared about a decade ago. In part, the small number of 
institutions in this region stems from the former political climate, which made this 
market impenetrable until the early 1990s. Also responsible for the limited 
microfinance activities in the region was the fact that many of the successes and 
lessons learned from the extensive history of microfinance in more traditional 
developing countries have proven difficult to transfer to Eastern European 
transitional economies. However, a recent surveys of the “microfinance sector in 
the ECA region reveals that it is a fast-growing industry. Institutions providing 
microfinance services are less than 10 years old, with a number of specialized 
institutions operating for only 3-5 years. Preliminary data suggests that MFI 
clients are growing by about 30 percent a year” (Djankov, Lieberman, Mukherjee 
and Nenova, 2002: 13). 
  
 
2.2. Institutional Variety in Providing Microfinance Services 
 
A multiplicity of markets requires a variety of institutional models for serving 
these markets. Although their systematization requires whole new chapter, the 
five most common microfinance institutional models, ranked by scope of impact 
and sustainability of operations, are as follows: full service commercial bank, 
restricted service bank, regulated non-bank financial institution, membership 
society/union/cooperative and non-governmental organization. In general, these 
types of entities are listed in order of decreasing levels of regulatory supervision 
and capital requirements.  
 
Yet, many authors have their own approach. Rutherford’s view of the microfinance 
institutions, for example, describes them as promoters and providers, where 
“promoters are those who help the poor set up their own poor-owned and poor-
managed systems, while providers are those who sell financial services to the 
poor” (Rutherford, 2000: 78). 
 
Another, slightly different approach (Jansson, 2001: 6) underlines more specific 
typology of institutions serving the micro-enterprise sector, as given below: 
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 Multipurpose 
financial 
institutions 
Specialized 
financial 
institutions 
Specialized 
non-
governmental 
organizations 
General non-
governmental 
organizations 
Purpose of 
microfinance 
activities 
- New market 
- Image 
- Philanthropy 
- Social impact 
- Profitability 
- Social impact 
- Sustainability 
and growth 
- Social impact 
- Sustainability 
Legal form - Banks, 
- Finance 
companies 
- Cooperatives 
- Banks, 
- Finance 
companies 
- Foundations 
- Associations 
- Foundations 
- Associations 
Clients - Various, 
micro-
enterprises are 
small share of 
portfolio 
- Small and 
micro-
enterprises 
- Micro-
enterprises 
- Micro-
enterprises 
Services - Various and 
targeted to the 
specific market 
segment 
- Individual 
credit 
- Savings 
- Individual 
credit 
- Group loans, 
- Limited 
offering of 
leasing 
- Savings 
- Individual 
credit 
- Solidarity 
loans 
- Village 
banking 
- Individual 
credit 
- Solidarity 
loans 
- Village 
banking 
Sources of 
funding 
- Savings 
- Shares 
- Bonds 
- Commercial 
loans  
- Commercial 
loans 
- Shares 
- Savings 
- Commercial 
and soft loans 
- Guarantees, 
- Donations 
- Donations,  
- Soft loan 
- Guarantees 
 
  
Not mentioning finance companies and savings houses/banks, in a recently 
published research Forster, Greene and Pytkowska (2003: 15) identify “four main 
microfinance models in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent 
States: credit unions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), downscaling 
commercial banks, and microfinance banks”.  
 
 
2.3. Trends in Microfinance Industry 
 
About two decades after the time when “development academics, sponsored by 
USAID, were busy mounting an assault on the whole idea of subsidised 
development finance” (Rutherford, 2003: 6), it is obvious that microfinance is 
becoming more commercial worldwide. Not only are traditional non-governmental 
organizations dedicated to microfinance transforming into licensed banks and non-
bank financial intermediaries in order to access public funds or small savings 
deposits, but some banks and finance companies are noticing the potential of 
micro-credit to enhance their own products. 
 
“The early success of non-profit grassroots organizations in serving this sector has 
led to two important developments” says Jansson (2001: 1). “First, commercial 
banks, realizing that there might be a profit to be made in microfinance, are 
starting to pay serious attention to how they can serve this segment of the 
market. Second, between grassroots non-profit organizations and profit-driven 
commercial banks, there is an emerging breed of professional financial institutions 
that specialize in microfinance. These are former non-profit organizations that 
have requested and received a license to operate as regulated and supervised 
finance companies or banks”. 
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At the same time, credit unions are revitalizing themselves and seeking to regain 
their leading role as suppliers of full-range financial services to the poor. Central 
Bank authorities and governments are examining whether microfinance 
represents a feasible option for rescuing troubled state-owned development, 
agricultural, savings, postal, trading and commercial banks. All of these 
organizations regard microfinance as a potentially viable business, regardless of 
whether they are constituted as profit-maximizing entities. An increasing number 
of people in the field regard commercialization as a necessary step to provide 
better quality financial services to the poor. “The microfinance revolution is a 
commercial revolution”, explains Robinson (2001: 24), simply opposing the claims 
that “the win-win rhetoric promising poverty alleviation with profits has moved far 
ahead of the evidence” (Morduch, 1999: 1609). 
 
In that respect, when trying to analyse the tendencies that were preceding 
commercialization, two major causes can be easily recognised: declination of 
technical donor grants and an increased array of social investments funds, as well 
as bilateral and multilateral investments. 
 
Namely, there is evidence in the past years that donors are getting tired of 
funding microfinance projects, for a variety of reasons. First, they feel like they 
have invested a lot of money in this sector over the last decade, but have not 
seen any appreciable change in the rates of poverty. Second, they find the risks in 
this field very high. While the industry has a few showcase success stories, it has 
many more examples of fraud and mismanagement. Third, most of the donor 
governments are directing their foreign aid funds to deal with world’s urgent 
problems, leaving less money for microfinance. Unless something can be done to 
radically change donors’ perceptions of the risks and rewards in this sector, it can 
be expected for this trend to continue. “Technical donor grant funding peaked in 
1999/2000 at almost USD 1 billion for microfinance and small business 
development programs. Amounts have been declining since 2000 and will be 
about USD 400 million in 2005”, says Vander Weele (2005: online). 
 
While donor funds are trending down over time, funds from government and 
social investment funds have greatly increased. “Major bilateral and multilateral 
investment entities report increasing commitment to micro and small business 
financing, from USD 600 million in 2000 to almost USD 1 billion per year” (ibid), 
while CGAP reports that social investment funds will grow from about USD 100 
million in 2003 to USD 200 million by 2006. 
 
In addition, many local governments are also providing loans to microfinance 
organizations, often with funds that come from the World Bank. It is now much 
easier to borrow funds than to get a grant. The International Finance Corporation 
is emerging as a key gatekeeper and a leader in this investment arena for 
microfinance. Beyond these sources, the next huge wave of investment funds 
could come from commercial investors who find microfinance to be a stable 
investment.  
 
In that sense, the other path in the process of commercialization of the 
microfinance industry is seen with more full scale banks entering into the market 
through downscaling of their operations. The bottom-line in microfinance is that 
there is money in it. It is seen in a way that there is money to be made in 
microfinance, that microfinance is good for the business, and what is good for the 
business should also be good for the community.  
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2.4. Rationale for Conversion 
 
Non-governmental organizations have been working in the area of microfinance 
for many years. As said, they are starting to formalize because they have found 
out that the type of services that they provide to the poor and other marginalized 
groups, are insufficient. Only by formalizing can they go into a deposit-taking 
mode and offer other services for which the micro-entrepreneurs that have 
progressed to a certain level are in need of. Therefore, the primary reason for this 
strategy is to overcome legal barriers and governance limitations inherent in 
unregulated organizations which restrict outreach and access to capital, also not 
forgetting the “limitations of the NGO modality arising from the lack of owners” 
(Fernando, 2003: 1). 
 
The significant outcomes of this approach are increased access to capital in the 
form of wholesale debt, deposits and investor equity, the ability to offer additional 
services such as savings and insurance products, and the ability to attract 
investors that may not have otherwise participated. Given these advantages, 
regulated microfinance institutions are able to reach far greater numbers of the 
poor while reducing dependency on donated funds. 
 
Yet, while focused on the rationale for conversion, various authors develop their 
own argumentation. White and Campion (2002: 22), for example, note that “the 
desire to join the financial system is a reflection of many microfinance NGOs’ twin 
goals of reducing donor dependence and exponentially increasing the number of 
clients with access to microfinance”. For Rosengard (2000: 7) the main reason for 
an NGO to become a regulated financial institution has been to achieve long-term 
sustainability, via a combination of the following factors:  
 
• Growth in the scale and scope of operations, which in turn increases the 
magnitude of development impact while reducing operational costs and 
diversifying operational risks;  
• Access to funds, whether in the form of local voluntary savings, large 
investor deposits, inter-bank loans, or capital market debt or equity, which 
decreases funding dependency and uncertainty while increasing capital 
leverage and the scope for business expansion;  
• Improved governance and operations, usually the result of regulations 
regarding ownership composition, management standards, prudential 
norms, and accounting and reporting requirements; and  
• Enhanced customer service, in the form of a wider range of products and 
delivery systems, together with the increased likelihood of developing a 
long-term banking relationship for savings, credit, and other financial 
services.  
 
Similar approach has been taken by Campion (2004: online). She lists, namely, 
five short objectives of conversion: 
 
• Access to commercial capital; 
• Expand client outreach; 
• Offer savings products; 
• Improve customer service; 
• Improve governance and accountability through private sector ownership. 
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So, based on the referred classifications, one overall view might define three 
major elements that are backing the rationale for NGO conversion:  
 
• Meeting demand for credit. As an NGO, MFI is unable to expand at the 
desired rate to meet demand for credit, even if that is part of the original 
NGO mandate. There is a need for additional financing to expand services, 
including the need for obtaining funds to increase its loan portfolio. At the 
same time, financing of the NGO faces decrease while the demand is 
increasing faster than funds are arriving;  
• Capturing savings. It is known that NGOs are restricted from using client’s 
savings, commercial debt, shareholder investments and loans from the 
Central Bank for the purpose of financing, which means that they are 
legally restricted from offering full financial services to their clients. In 
addition, in some countries there is a problem with inflation and saving in 
banks can offer security on the value of clients’ funds;  
• Launching market driven approach. Some NGOs want to create market-
driven approach to micro-lending. By paying for its funds through interest 
on savings deposits, dividends, inter-bank loans and other means available 
to regulated financial institutions, converted NGOs could accomplish 
expansion, be market driven and be independent from the donated funds. 
NGO might be sustainable but significant expansion calls for more funds. In 
this way, they are solving long-term economic challenge, serving clients not 
beneficiaries and funding programs though investors not donors. 
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3. Nine East European MFIs  
 
  
In the last several years Opportunity International network has worked with 14 of 
its partners as they have started the transition from non-governmental 
organization to formal financial institution. From this it has been learned that the 
process is longer, more arduous and more risky than originally anticipated, and 
not one to be entered into lightly. On the other hand, it has been seen that those 
organizations that do successfully make the transition to formal financial 
institutions have access to many times more funding than those who remain as 
NGOs. 
   
 
3.1. Opportunity International Network 
 
The constituents of the Opportunity International network are divided into two 
main types of institutions – support partners that raise money and other 
resources, and implementing partners that provide financial services to the poor. 
The clients of the support partners are government, corporate and private donors 
in their countries. The clients of the implementing partners are those living in 
poverty that borrow money, save and in some cases purchase insurance from 
them. 
  
The Opportunity International network includes 41 implementing partners in 26 
countries, and one pilot program in China. As of the end of December 2004 these 
organizations together were serving 675,588 clients with a loan portfolio of USD 
130 million. Combined, they maintain the quality of this portfolio, with arrears 
over 30 days at 2.01%, and operate profitably, with total earned income 
exceeding costs by more than 7%. A little more than half of OI implementing 
partners (22 of 41) operate profitably. Most of these are in Eastern Europe, Latin 
America and the Philippines.  
 
However, these combined numbers can mask a great deal of variation in 
performance among these member organizations: 
 
• 25% of OI members serve 69% of its clients. Of these ten organizations, 
five are in the Philippines, two are in Africa, and one each are in Nicaragua, 
India and Indonesia;  
• 25% of OI members manage 73% of its loan portfolio. Of these, six are in 
Eastern Europe, two in the Philippines and one each in Africa (Ghana) and 
Latin America (Nicaragua);  
• Only four organizations are on both lists;  
 
Recently, OI conducted an analysis of the clients of its implementing partners, 
asking them to carry out a survey with a sample group of 500 clients. OI has 
received and compiled the data from over 6,000 clients and then weighted it 
according to overall client distribution around the world. Here is what was found:  
Most of OI clients are very poor, but they have more resources than thought – 
43% of them earn less than USD 1 per day per family member and an additional 
22% earn between USD 1 and USD 2 per day, yet a majority of OI clients have 
access to running water, electricity and an indoor toilet. For 58% of OI clients 
their business is their sole source of income, while the remainder have additional 
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sources of household income, such as the employment of a spouse. 16% of OI 
clients receive money transfers from relatives living abroad.  
 
There is a strong demand for more credit among OI clients, and a varying demand 
for additional financial services. Most clients would like to borrow more, showing 
high levels of unmet demand among the existing clients base, let alone among 
those currently not reached. Actually, the number of clients served by the 
Network has been growing at a rate of 30% per year, while funding for the 
Network has been growing at a rate of 15% per year. 
 
In 1995 the OI commissioned a study of the market for funding for microfinance. 
That study found that support for microfinance from government institutions was 
growing at a rate of 40% per year. In the past few years funding from 
government institutions has stopped growing and started to decline. Two major 
factors account for this. First, in the aftermath of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
much of the foreign aid from the US and the UK has moved to these two countries, 
leaving less available for microfinance work in other countries. Second, the 
governments of all the Western countries have signed on to a set of goals for the 
results they want to achieve with foreign aid. These goals cover areas like 
eradicating extreme poverty, providing universal education, empowering women, 
reducing child mortality and combating HIV/AIDS. While microfinance has an 
impact on all these areas, it is not the major focus of any of them. 
 
The technical donor and investor community globally has become substantially 
more sophisticated over the last five years in terms of their knowledge of 
microfinance and have steadily raised their performance expectations and 
requirements for MFIs. The bar for receiving grant funding has been raised much 
higher while the amount of grant funding available has declined. Exacerbating this 
environment is the major increase in the number of MFIs and networks competing 
for these limited funds. In this environment it is almost impossible to market a 
weak performing MFI to a technical donor institution - and it is as equally 
impossible to hide weak performance when donors can depend on consultants and 
ratings firms to gain independent assessments of performance. In addition, 
technical donors want to see that the organizations that receive their grants have 
sufficient knowledge and authority to apply best practices and intervene when 
problems start to emerge.  
 
On the other side, Opportunity International receives more in private donations 
than any other microfinance network. Most of the other networks are largely 
dependent on government funds for their operations, while for OI the income of 
support partners is almost equally split between public and private sources. Yet, 
the total amount of private contributions that go to microfinance in all of the 
countries where OI operates is a very small percentage of total donations for 
international aid programs.  
 
   
3.2. OI’s East European Implementing Partners 
 
In 2003 Opportunity International celebrated 10 years of operation in Eastern 
Europe. Since 1993, Eastern European partners have adopted a range of legal 
formats to suit their lending environments, with a deliberate trend towards 
creating formal financial institutions. Opportunity Bank Montenegro became the 
first full-service bank in the region, while two domestic savings houses/banks 
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(Serbia and Macedonia) and one foundation (Russia) expect to convert to full 
commercial bank status during 2005. 
  
Comparing to other regions the nine East European implementing partners led the 
notable milestones and achievements of Opportunity International network in the 
past years, among them the leading performances in terms of operational and 
financial sustainability. Yet, there are challenges, both conceptual and operational, 
to be dealt with. Serving only 6.3% of the OI network active clients with nearly 
60% of the whole OI network portfolio, and still being in demand for new sources 
of funds, these MFIs are turning towards rapid commercialization. 
 
As far as their institutional form is concerned, their initial and current status 
varies. At present (February 2005), out of nine MFIs, one is full scale bank (OBM - 
Montenegro), two are savings houses/banks (Moznosti - Macedonia and OIS - 
Serbia), three are finance companies (PShM - Albania, Inicjatywa Mikro – Poland 
and OMRO - Romania), two are credit cooperatives (Nachala - Bulgaria and NOA - 
Croatia) and one is an NGO/Foundation (FORA - Russia). As most of them 
underwent or undergo changes that are to meet their current needs, here is the 
overview (Opportunity International, 2002) of their institutional development: 
 
 
PARTNER FOUNDED 
AS… 
YEAR OF 
FOUNDATION 
CONVERTED 
TO… 
YEAR OF 
CONVERSION 
PShM Savings and 
Credit Co-op.  
1998 Joint Stock Co. 2001 
Nachala NGO 
Foundation 
1993 Credit Co-op. 1997 
NOA Savings and 
Credit Co-op. 
1996     
Moznosti NGO 
Association 
1996 Savings 
House/Bank 
2000 
MCM 
 
NGO 1999 Bank - OBM 2002 
IM Ltd. Co. 1996     
IZVOR NGO 
Association 
1995 Ltd. Co. - OMRO 2000 
OI Russia Separate NGO 
entities 
1993 Consolidated 
NGO - FORA 
2000 
OI Serbia Savings 
House/Bank 
2002     
 
 
3.2.1. PSHM – Albania 
  
PShM Sh.a. (PShM Ltd.) is OI’s Albanian microfinance partner dedicated to 
providing credit and business support to microbusiness entrepreneurs throughout 
Albania. PShM began lending as a credit cooperative in August 1999, converting 
to a finance company in March 2001. With equity capital derived from a grant by 
USAID, it is licensed by the National Bank of Albania to make loans as a non-bank 
financial institution. Despite growing competition, PShM occupies a strong market 
position in Albania and is coordinating its micro-lending with the activities of 
several NGOs so as to target greater numbers of poor clients.  
 
As of December 31, 2004, PShM had 4,336 active clients and loan portfolio 
outstanding of USD 9.14 mil. In May 2002, PShM signed a sub-grant agreement 
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with Chemonics International in loan funds and technical assistance costs over the 
next three years. This award was based on a joint proposal winning a competitive 
submission for USAID’s integrated Small Credit and Assistance Protect in Albania. 
Under this contract PShM has adapted its micro-lending products and systems to 
the needs of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the production sector. 
During 2004 PShM succeeded to attract the interest of several important social 
funds (Blue Orchard, DB Microcredit Fund, Triodos Fund, Fue Vert) and to conclude loan 
agreements, that way increasing significantly its portfolio outstanding. 
  
There is no present plan to convert PShM to a bank. 
 
INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers 378 1,421 1,609 1,822 2,921 4,336
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) 265 962 2,444 2,572 5,540 9,141
# Loans Made 390 1,781 2,016 na na 4,794
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) 320 2,014 3,846 na na 12,222
Average Loan Size (USD) 821 1,131 1,908 2,207 2,047 2,549
Operational Sustainability 29% 53% 73% 107% 107% 116%
Financial Sustainability 29% 48% 59% 96% 95% 108%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) - 1.99% 2.02% 1.86% 0.48% 1.70%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) - 4.51% 3.65% 2.92% 1.25% 3.79%
# Clients per Loan Officer - 84 80 107 68 167
Note: Change of color indicates the year of conversion into a f inancial company
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3.2.2. Nachala – Bulgaria 
  
Nachala was OI’s first partner in Eastern Europe and was incorporated in July 
1993 as a Bulgarian not-for-profit foundation. Nachala’s mission is to provide 
opportunities for the needy, poor and unemployed to transform their lives by 
providing small business loans and counsel. Due to changes in Bulgarian law and 
severe economic crisis, lending was suspended in early 1996. In July 1997 
Nachala’s Board decided to form a Credit Cooperative, using the credit union form 
of lending as the most flexible and appropriate in the context of the country’s 
economic environment and legislative framework. Cooperatives also have long 
traditions in pre-communist Bulgaria as a tool for mutual assistance for successful 
business and social development. Nachala Cooperative started lending in 
December 1997.  
 
In May 2002 Nachala entered into an agreement with USAID to increase grant 
funding. A grant is managed by OI-US, and the increase provided almost new 
funds for Nachala, increasing its equity significantly. Nachala received an initial 
grant from USAID in 1999, at which time it was one of three MFls to receive grant 
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funding from USAID. Nachala is the only one of these MFIs to receive an 
expansion grant, which is the direct result of an evaluation of the micro-enterprise 
sector conducted by an independent consulting firm engaged by USAID. The 
consulting firm’s review was extremely positive and complimentary about the 
performance of Nachala.  
 
As of December 31, 2004, Nachala had 2,363 active clients and loan portfolio 
outstanding of USD 4.56 mil. 
   
 
INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers 835 1,141 1,365 1,580 2,107 2,363
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) 1,001 1,618 1,865 2,513 4,258 4,560
# Loans Made 1,122 1,352 1,446 na na 2,730
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) 2,002 2,622 2,877 na na 6,833
Average Loan Size (USD) 1,784 1,939 1,990 2,097 2,317 2,503
Operational Sustainability 89% 98% 90% 76% 100% 103%
Financial Sustainability % 81% 78% 72% 91% 94%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) 1.57% 0.78% 2.04% 104.00% 0.63% 0.91%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) 5.00% 2.50% 3.68% 1.96% 1.45% 2.02%
# Clients per Loan Officer - - 62 61 124 84
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3.2.3. NOA - Croatia 
 
NOA was founded as a Savings and Loan Co-operative (SLC) in 1996 in a region 
of considerable ethnic and religious division, and one which was consequently torn 
apart by war in 1991. From the outset, NOA’s principal goals were to provide 
loans to small businesses in the war-torn areas of Eastern Croatia, generating 
new jobs and stability of employment, and seeking to encourage the return of 
refugees from neighboring Serbia. NOA’s Board of Directors and staff reflect both 
the ethnic and religious diversity that is characteristic for the region. 
 
In February 2004 NOA had to pay 700.000 USD of tax for USAID donation in 1996. 
In year 2004, as well as in the first four months of year 2005, while NOA is 
repaying the short term loan borrowed from Hypo Bank aimed to pay the tax, 
NOA stagnates in development until the portfolio consolidation. Thus, as of 
December 31, 2004 NOA had 585 active clients and outstanding loan portfolio of 
USD 4.16 mil.  
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Out of 100, NOA is still the third largest SLC in the Republic of Croatia. 
 
INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers 527 594 625 598 589 585
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) 2,346 2,491 2,674 2,925 3,660 3,972
# Loans Made 333 384 347 na na 168
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) 1,686 1,557 1,785 na na 1,199
Average Loan Size (USD) 5,063 4,055 5,144 4,675 6,589 7,142
Operational Sustainability 122% 102% 110% 108% 116% 112%
Financial Sustainability % 88% 107% 105% 94% 111%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) 6.51% 6.04% 4.69% 3.84% 3.98% 3.32%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) 19.80% 11.04% 11.37% 11.16% 14.59% 15.72%
# Clients per Loan Officer - 149 78 85 98 117
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3.2.4. Moznosti – Macedonia 
 
Moznosti was established on OI initiative as a humanitarian association in 1996 to 
provide help to Macedonian citizens in the development of their entrepreneurial 
activities through the provision of micro-credit facilities. Moznosti was the first MFI 
in Macedonia and has received subsequent grants from USAID, successfully 
consolidating its position as the country’s leading microfinance provider. In May 
2000, Moznosti converted to a Savings House/Bank as a step towards becoming a 
full service bank, having the original NGO as sole owner. However, continual 
changes in the banking law, coupled with economic and political instability 
consequential to the civil conflict in 2001, have contributed to the delayed 
conversion into a bank.  
 
Later amendments to the banking law meant that Moznosti was able to press 
ahead with its application without previous restrictions on ownership or having to 
announce liquidation of the Savings House. Efforts directed to transitioning to a 
full service bank have resulted in refusal by the Central Bank dated early 2004, 
explained as simple incompatibility of the not-for-profit character of the NGO with 
its role as a sole owner of the profit motivated FFI. Contrary to the refusal, a full-
scope examination of SH Moznosti conducted later 2004 by the Central Bank, 
found it to be the best-capitalized Savings House/Bank in Macedonia. The most 
recent loan agreement has been concluded with the German Development Bank 
(KfW). 
 
As of December 31, 2004, Moznosti had 4,871 active clients and loan portfolio 
outstanding of USD 13.6 mil. A key challenge facing Moznosti is to maintain its 
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high profile and competitive advantage, while transitioning to a full service bank 
in 2005. 
 
INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers 798 1,763 2,740 2,616 3,709 4,871
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) 2,608 4,444 3,096 4,298 7,559 13,600
# Loans Made 745 1,810 2,424 1,921 2,467 3,369
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) 2,898 5,276 3,922 3,200 6,315 10,398
Average Loan Size (USD) 3,890 2,915 1,618 1,666 2,757 3,086
Operational Sustainability 84% 178% 126% 145% 135% 136%
Financial Sustainability % 113% 93% 133% 127% 131%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) 0.84% 0.72% 4.81% 1.14% 1.42% 1.81%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) na 2.51% 14.36% 3.30% 3.53% 4.24%
# Clients per Loan Officer na 160 274 138 177 187
Note: Change of color indicates the year of conversion into a savings house/bank
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3.2.5. MCM/OBM – Montenegro 
 
Opportunity Bank Montenegro (OBM) is the successor to Microcredit Montenegro 
(MCM), which was founded in 1999 as a non-governmental, non-profit 
organization offering loans to small-business entrepreneurs in Montenegro. MCM's 
primary target clients were entrepreneurs and farmers who lacked the financial 
means necessary to develop their business. MCM grew rapidly into a highly 
successful microfinance institution, making nearly ten thousand loans worth over 
USD 14.5 million to small businesses from July 1999 through to June 2002. The 
clients of MCM have mostly become clients of OBM, and MCM has ceased to grant 
new loans in 2002.  
 
Opportunity Bank Montenegro (OBM) was founded in April 2002 to finance the 
growth of micro and small enterprises in Montenegro and to offer safe savings 
services to the Montenegrin public, as OI’s first fully licensed bank in the region. 
OBMs equity also comprises a number of minority private shareholdings. OBM is a 
licensed and regulated full service bank that provides loans to both existing 
businesses and start-ups. As well as taking deposits, OBM is developing lending 
products for the SME sector. Loan sizes range from EUR 500 to EUR 10,000 for 
micro-entrepreneurs and generally up to EUR 100,000 (with a present average 
loan size of EUR 30,000) for small enterprises. 
 
OBM opened its doors to the public in July 2002 and disbursed 140 loans in its 
first week of operation. During 2004 number of social and even private investors 
made some type of borrowings or investment, including EBRD. That led to loan 
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portfolio outstanding of USD 28.47 mil. - the largest in the OI Network, followed 
by 7,320 active clients as of December 31, 2004. 
 
INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers 713 2,507 4,231 4,942 5,700 7,320
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) 887 2,252 3,509 8,715 16,793 28,476
# Loans Made 730 3,176 4,332 na na 7,030
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) 1,141 4,208 6,197 na na 31,541
Average Loan Size (USD) 1,563 1,325 1,431 2,103 3,685 4,486
Operational Sustainability 52% 117% 130% 98% 114% 117%
Financial Sustainability 52% 80% 65% 71% 95% 108%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) 1.00% 1.51% 0.82% 0.63% 0.81% 0.57%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) 6.44% 2.21% 1.48% 1.07% 1.79% 1.17%
# Clients per Loan Officer - - 201 225 238 252
Note: Change of color indicates the year of conversion into a full service bank
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3.2.6. Inicjatywa Mikro – Poland 
 
Inicjatywa Mikro Sp. Z.o.o. (IM), established as finance company in 1996, is OI’s 
microfinance partner operating in southern Poland, where for decades 
employment was concentrated in state-owned factories and mines. As many of 
these have closed or been downsized since 1989, IM is among the few sources of 
credit serving a micro-enterprise sector that has become increasingly important in 
generating jobs. IM is in a good position to fulfil its mission of supporting 
enterprise development and job creation, and intends to continue to build on its 
strong and sustainable performance in the region thus far.  
 
As of December 31, 2004, IM had 902 active clients and loan portfolio outstanding 
of USD 2.46 mil. However, IM is in need of grant and/or borrowing facilities of in 
order to achieve its growth targets. Since becoming a bank is out of the question 
due to the high capital threshold, and borrowing funds is usually costly, one 
alternative for IM is to act as service deliverer for government sponsored 
programs supporting small enterprise. 
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INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers 389 667 634 693 831 902
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) 882 1,060 1,273 1,477 1,892 2,464
# Loans Made 534 552 474 na na 582
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) 1,318 1,314 1,392 na na 1,996
Average Loan Size (USD) 2,468 2,380 2,937 2,965 3,188 3,429
Operational Sustainability 112% 91% 106% 107% 94% 121%
Financial Sustainability 112% 74% 94% 100% 91% 109%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) 3.15% 2.43% 2.33% 2.00% 1.61% 1.62%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) 13.06% 13.37% 21.46% 19.10% 18.43% 11.38%
# Clients per Loan Officer - - 127 116 139 129
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3.2.7. Izvor/OMRO – Romania 
 
Opportunity Microcredit Romania S.R.L. (OMRO) was registered as a finance 
company in December 2000, following changes in Romanian law governing credit 
cooperatives, which obliged Izvor, OI’s former microfinance partner and co-owner 
of OMRO, to modify its legal and organizational structure.  
 
Izvor as a non-profit association was established in 1995. Since it was impossible 
for a non-profit association to disburse money as credits, it started operating as a 
sort of leasing company offering credit in kind - equipments and machines. In 
1999 Izvor gets to know the existence of an advantageous Cooperatives law, and 
decided to operate as a cooperative delivering cash loans to its members. When, 
in 2000, the Cooperatives law changed, imposing restrictions, OI and Izvor 
registered Opportunity Microcredit Romania Ltd company. OMRO started its 
operations, as a limited liability commercial company in February 2001 when Izvor 
transferred its lending operations to OMRO. The National Bank of Romania has 
given OMRO an exemption letter providing a legal basis to operate as a non-bank 
finance company. This provides a better legal basis for micro-lending than an NGO. 
Izvor continues to operate offering training and other non-financial services to the 
OMRO’s clients. 
 
There is no present plan to convert OMRO to a bank.   
 
As of December 31, 2004, OMRO had 1,109 active clients and loan portfolio 
outstanding of USD 3.31 mil. The challenge facing OMRO is to find new sources of 
funds to on-lend to this virtually untapped sector. It is expected few equity 
commitments and a loan agreed with Societe Generale during 2004 to be 
completed in the first half of 2005. 
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INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers 292 792 810 1,081 938 1,109
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) 226 573 899 1,338 1,751 3,312
# Loans Made 557 1,185 1,279 na na 1,270
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) 573 1,199 1,580 na na 3,449
Average Loan Size (USD) 1,029 1,012 1,235 1,618 2,159 2,716
Operational Sustainability 118% 103% 119% 110% 116% 189%
Financial Sustainability % 46% 96% 88% 98% 151%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) 1.99% 3.87% 1.76% 1.52% 0.54% 0.47%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) 2.70% 10.81% 5.67% 5.16% 4.42% 3.07%
# Clients per Loan Officer - 113 116 135 134 123
Note: Change of color indicates the year of conversion into a f inancial company
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3.2.8. FORA – Russia 
 
Fund Opportunity Russia (FORA) was created in 2000 when three OI-Russia 
partners (Perspectiva in Veliky Novgorod, Novy Soyuz in Voronezh, and 
Soprichastnost in Rostov-on-Don) and a new office Nadezhniy Partner in Saratov 
consolidated. The streamlining of management and operations coupled with a 
grant from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) has 
resulted in FORA’s exponential growth and demonstrable ability to reach more 
clients more efficiently while building a stronger organization.  
 
As a member of the Russian Microfinance Working Group, FORA is also at the 
forefront of efforts to create a more positive regulatory framework for 
microfinance in Russia. FORA is actively developing a strategic partnership with 
the banking sector, mainly through the Association of Russian Bankers (ARB). 
FORA also continues to take a leading role in lobbying the State Duma of the 
Russian Federation for changes to enhance the legal environment for microfinance.  
 
Meanwhile, on its meeting in May 2004 the Board delivered formal decision for 
commencement of the conversion process into bank.  
 
During 2004 several large loan agreements have been concluded with the leading 
social investors and a bank such as Oikocredit, Blue Orchard and Societe Generale. 
That resulted in increase of FORA’s loan portfolio to USD 15.2 mil. as of December 
31, 2004. As of the same date, FORA had 16,327 active clients maintaining 
portfolio at risk (over 1 day) at less than 0.4 %, the lowest in the OI Network. 
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INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers 1,759 2,067 6,136 10,788 12,564 16,327
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) 1,011 1,305 3,542 6,419 8,454 15,272
# Loans Made 3,905 6,763 12,268 na na 32,548
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) 3,124 5,510 10,107 na na 40,790
Average Loan Size (USD) 800 815 824 871 961 1,253
Operational Sustainability 70% 94% 67% 121% 149% 143%
Financial Sustainability % 60% 41% 84% 104% 106%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) 3.22% 0.92% 0.61% 0.44% 0.33% 0.16%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) 3.90% 0.97% 0.74% 0.64% 0.45% 0.28%
# Clients per Loan Officer - 94 120 183 137 155
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3.2.9. OIS – Serbia 
 
Stedionica Opportunity International a.d., or OI Serbia, is OI’s newest partner in 
Eastern Europe, based in Novi Sad, in the region of Vojvodina. While there is no 
law allowing NGOs to provide microfinance in Serbia, OI Serbia was licensed by 
the National Bank of Yugoslavia in July, 2002. Its goal is to become the primary 
provider of financial services to micro and small businesses within the country. 
With a start-up grant from USAID, the mission of OI Serbia is to create 
employment opportunities and improve the standard of living among its clients 
and their families, regardless of ethnicity, religious, or political affiliations.  
 
OI Serbia began lending in August 2002, with loans ranging from EUR 1,000 to 
EUR 10,000.  OI Serbia was profitable after only six months.  A second grant from 
USAID will be used to convert to a full commercial bank, expected in 2005.   
  
As of December 31, 2004, OI Serbia had 2,523 active clients and loan portfolio 
outstanding of over USD 4.99 mil. Two large equity commitments, by Oikocredit 
and a private investor are expected during the first months of 2005. 
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INDICATOR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# Active Borrow ers - - - 608 1,917 2,523
Portfolio Outstanding (USD'000) - - - 894 2,317 4,998
# Loans Made - - - na na 2,720
Value of Loans Made (USD'000) - - - na na 6,936
Average Loan Size (USD) - - - 1,691 1,857 2,550
Operational Sustainability - - - 75% 125% 109%
Financial Sustainability - - - 69% 93% 83%
Portfolio In Arrears (>30 days) - - - 0.00% 0.45% 0.21%
Portfolio At Risk (>30 Days) - - - 0.00% 0.73% 0.31%
# Clients per Loan Officer - - - 68 137 93
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4. Processing Conversion: Structure and Phases 
 
 
There is a variety of models prescribed as necessary steps to undergo conversion. 
However, certain steps cannot be avoided: feasibility study of proposed FFI, 
promotion of the project among financial institutions and potential investors, 
coordination with the authorities and especially the Central Bank, legal 
registration, issuing of stocks and preparation of investment documents, 
negotiation with the existing donors to transfer funds from the NGO and 
coordination of the organization and design of new business plan for the bank and 
the remaining NGO. These steps have been structured by Campion (2004: online) 
in three groups of activities: 
 
• Organizational transformation [i.e. conversion, n.a.] - licensing process; 
• Financial transformation - raising equity, transferring debt; 
• Operational transformation - transfer of systems, human resources, clients. 
 
Of course, the basic precondition for conversion includes the need to ensure that 
the organization is sustainable. It is crucial not only for obtaining a license, but 
also for pursuing investors and selling the equity. Sustainability, however, is a 
difficult precondition because it has many meanings. Sustainability could range 
from highly subsidized programs to fully financially self-supporting organizations.  
 
On their side the regulators have established minimum standards for NGO-MFI 
intending to undergo process of conversion. So, prior to any thought on entering 
the regulated world, “five issues need to be considered: minimal capital 
requirement, capital adequacy, liquidity requirements, asset quality and portfolio 
diversification” (Ledgerwood, 1999: 23). 
 
The conversion plan involves many phases - some of which can be undertaken 
concurrently, while others must necessarily be sequential. While it is important 
that the vision of conversion can be translated into implementation in as short a 
period as possible, there are nonetheless inherent risks to the overall objective if 
any of the phases is inadequately progressed. It is important, therefore, that 
consideration is given to a realistic evaluation of the timescales which are required 
to undertake the conversion process - while this will inevitably vary between 
different bank conversion situations, broad development parameters must be 
agreed so that realistic expectations and financial contingencies can be 
established. 
 
A summary of the conversion process and its timeframe as suggested for 
implementation within OI Network (see Prat, 2002), is shown in the table below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
Phase 
 
 
Year 
1 
Qtr. 1 
 
Year 
1 
Qtr. 2 
 
Year 
1 
Qtr. 3 
 
Year 
1 
Qtr. 4 
 
Year 
2 
Qtr. 1 
 
Year 
2 
Qtr. 2 
 
Year 
2 
Qtr. 3 
 
Year 
2 
Qtr. 4 
Vision xxx        
Strategy  xxx Xxx      
Investment 
Proposition 
 xxx Xxx      
Framework   Xxx xxx     
Enablement    xxx xxx xxx xxx  
Regulatory 
Authorities 
  Xxx    xxx  
Operations       xxx xxx 
Compliance / 
Audit 
     xxx  xxx 
 
 
4.1. Vision, Long Term Objectives and Strategy 
 
It is necessary to establish an enduring objective that will be progressed over the 
longer-term, with all commercial and social implications anticipated. As such, the 
vision will determine the values of the bank, and not the means by which they will 
be achieved. It provides a checkpoint against which individual short and medium 
term initiatives should be validated to ensure that these are consistent. 
 
The Strategy of the bank is to progress the vision. The direction and commercial 
activities of the strategy should be consistent with, and contributory to, the spirit 
and direction of the vision. 
 
It will be recognized that there will be a series of evolving strategies to be 
undertaken by the bank and that these will involve different initiatives and 
periodic corrections/readjustments of activities, in response to business growth, 
market conditions and environmental pressures. 
 
 
4.2. Conversion Model and Investment Proposition 
 
Generally, new investments are based on the individual characteristics of the 
entity under consideration. The most common criteria are outreach potential 
(determined by population size, level of poverty, and microfinance market 
conditions), profitability potential (competitive structure of microfinance market 
and legal environment), transformation potential (cultural receptivity to 
transformation indicators), and investment potential (largely determined by 
regional brand value and interested investors).  
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Therefore, the investment proposition must address and meet the needs of the 
various stakeholders in the establishment and development of the bank. As such, 
it requires the continuing acceptance of the vision and the on-going strategy. 
 
The investment proposition must be acceptable to a wide range of participants – 
the financial investors, which must capitalize and be ready to support the 
development of the bank; the government, which seeks to achieve a wider social 
development for its people; the regulatory authorities, which must maintain the 
stability and confidence of the financial sector; the transitioning NGOs, which need 
to accept the basis of transition and their future role; the staff of both the bank 
and the transitioning NGO, who must address their financial and motivational 
needs; and, the clients, whose needs must be respected. 
 
 
4.3. New Internal Standards 
 
There is a need of internally designed framework to deal with the issues of 
governance, management structure, business plan, policies and products. This 
internal framework establishes the standards by which the bank shall operate – 
and thereby develops the culture and values which underpin operational activities. 
As such, it requires the investment proposition to have endorsed and supported 
the strategy so that the various stakeholders can be committed to the 
development of the bank and the scope of activity which can be addressed by 
available resources. 
 
The internal framework must incorporate governance and business development 
environments which will translate the strategic objectives into a controlled 
business operation. The operational stability of the bank will require a framework 
of rules and policies, together with a capability for independent review at different 
levels of management. 
 
In addition, enablement process has to be designed, so to establish the means by 
which the internal framework is to be implemented. As such, the standards 
defined can be translated into an operational structure which will be the basis of 
the operational stability and integrity of the bank.  
  
 
4.4. Regulatory Process 
 
The regulatory process provides the authorization and continuing approval for the 
activities of the banks. As such, they undertake due diligence of the strategy and 
the standards which have been established, together with their compliance with 
regulatory and legislative requirements. It provides also the objective criteria 
against which the future discharge of the operational activities can be measured. 
 
It should be anticipated that there will be a continuing dialogue with the 
regulatory authorities during the evolving phases to ensure that such 
development is consistent with the requirements and expectations of the 
authorities. 
 
The regulatory authority dimension establishes an essential focal point in the 
development of the bank and is an absolute precursor to the commencement of 
operational activities. 
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The regulatory process varies significantly by country. It is important to 
communicate with the appropriate regulatory authorities at all steps in the 
process of creating a new bank or converting an NGO into some form of bank. 
After initial communications and a general agreement concerning regulatory plans, 
the formal regulatory process in all countries starts with the submission of a 
license application. The form and content of the application varies significantly by 
country and type of bank. 
 
It is a common policy to comply with all regulatory requirements. However, in 
some cases, standard bank regulations make it difficult or impossible to provide 
microfinance services for poor clients. Such regulatory constraints often relate to 
collateral requirements, reserve requirements, branch requirements, and capital 
or ownership requirements. The microfinance industry generally has had success 
in obtaining specific exemptions from certain regulatory obstacles.  
  
 
4.5. Operations and Compliance 
 
Operations reflect the commercial implementation of the activities determined by 
the strategy, in accordance with the standards established, and consistent with 
the requirements or constraints imposed by the regulatory authorities. 
 
Compliance has been seen as an independent defence of the bank to maintain its 
stability through the discharge of the agreed framework standards and to 
maintain the support of the regulatory authorities. 
 29 
 
5. Conversion Implications 
 
 
The certain emergence of two entities and their separation affects all: board 
members, managers, staff and clients. The decision, process, advantages and 
disadvantages, implications, and actions to be taken need to be known and 
understood by all concerned. This will help to stop people from developing wrong 
perceptions which could cause undesirable resentment and damages that take 
long time and effort to correct. It is important to ensure that the concept of 
forming banks/FFIs is widely discussed and its implications widely understood. 
Clarity guarantees commitment and resolution whilst confusion causes a sense of 
exclusion and demotivation of people thereby adversely affecting present and 
future performance. 
 
 
5.1. Key Issues and Debates 
 
Properly prepared debate on the key issues is necessary for the future conversion 
process as many of the conversion elements are unknown on the beginning. “The 
transformation [i.e. conversion, n.a.] process is extremely difficult and time-
consuming”, underlines Rosengard (2000: 8). In his classification, he 
concentrates the main challenges around the following key issues: 
 
• Strategic: Commercialization and corporatization of an NGO can be quite 
painful. Although it is essential to attain financial sustainability, it can lead 
to a divergence from the institution’s mission and market, for example, by 
making larger loans to achieve economies of scale in credit operations. 
 
• Operational: The operational requirements, both back office and front office, 
differ significantly for savings from those needed to administer a credit 
program: not only are the transactions both smaller and more numerous 
and the interest calculations more varied, but it is the saver and not the 
lender who determines the timing of these transactions; 
 
• Regulation and Supervision: Microfinance is a new market for most 
regulatory agencies, and considerable dialogue is often necessary to find a 
way to adapt the objectives and norms of standard prudential regulation 
and supervision to measures and standards appropriate for microfinance. 
The most controversial are usually requirements for ownership and 
governance, loan classification and provisioning, and reporting. 
 
In this respect, the following classification has been made based on the 
experience of the MFIs studied in this research.  
 
 
5.1.1. Being Graduated: Picking the Right Time 
 
In most of the cases initiation of NGO conversion cannot be seen as serious 
without having all possible circumstances in sight, including those at macro level. 
As Campion emphasizes (2004: online) there are prerequisites in the face of the 
“conducive external environment: political and economic stability, government 
recognition of micro-enterprise sector, supportive regulatory environment and the 
market potential”. The fact is that issues such as the social environment, 
 30 
macroeconomic indicators, restructuring processes of the financial sector, legal 
provisions, the future market positioning and many other might be never 
favourable all together, but at least those aspects are to be accounted for prior to 
taking the decision.  
 
Having these general issues discussed, what is to be critically judged next is the 
so called graduation of the NGO - its capability to keep on track good and stable 
performance on a mid-term basis. This means that it should be able to cover all of 
its costs, including operational expenses, the cost of funds, and loan losses. It 
should also be able to generate a modest surplus for reinvestment in new 
products, delivery systems and technology.  
 
All of this is needed in order to ensure the sustainability of the organization, which 
is an unavoidable precondition for obtaining a license from the Central Bank. Of 
course, in progressing through the levels of sustainability, any NGO must first 
show operational before accomplishing financial sustainability. The emphasis on 
sustainability promotes economic efficiency, decreases dependency on external 
resources, and creates the principal positive incentive for savers to deposit their 
funds - trust that their savings are secure, and for borrowers to repay their loans. 
 
As said, no Central Bank will consider allowing a conversion until this condition is 
met. And this is a reasonable condition, because there is little inherent to the 
newly approved bank status that leads to greater sustainability in the first year 
after the conversion. In fact, many cases show that due to reserve requirements, 
higher taxes, investments in technology and higher reporting costs, initial 
expenses can be higher for banks than they are for NGOs. In a word, the bottom 
line is that the NGO must be running in a tight and sustainable manner before it 
should begin any process of conversion. 
 
The additional attributes that characterize successful NGO prepared to undertake 
the conversion process are supposed to include increasing or at least stable 
number of clients, followed by decreasing or at least stable portfolio at risk 
indicator.  
 
Finally, NGOs should not initiate conversion into a bank unless and until they have 
a proper MIS that can report daily closing information. This is a non-negotiable 
requirement that must be met upfront, not at some future date after the bank is 
already open for business. A well designed MIS will not only meet government 
reporting requirements, it will also assist in tracking and managing arrears, will 
enable loan officers to handle a larger active customer base, and will provide the 
right information on a timely basis for tight financial management. 
 
However, as described in the following sections, all these prerequisites represent 
the necessary conditions for conversion to be launched. They are certainly not 
sufficient conditions for successfulness of the process.  
 
 
5.1.2. The Role of the NGO: Initial and Remaining 
 
The experience shows that in most of the cases the initiative for conversion comes 
from the NGO or, from the existing NGO donors interested for transfer of their 
capital into FFI. As the negotiating process with the donor of the funds operated 
by the NGO starts on the very beginning of the conversion process, the next issue 
is the structure and the sources of the foundation capital.  
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Knowing that many Central Banks are not accustomed with NGO as sole 
investor/shareholder, the issue should be double checked in advance. If bank 
regulations do not allow one single entity to have full ownership of a bank, NGO 
cannot be the sole owner of the FFIs to be established even in cases where they 
can raise the capital required. Therefore, the NGOs are compelled to share 
ownership of the entity of their own creation. 
 
Mechanisms of the transfer of portfolio from the NGO to the bank are next. In 
most of the cases, the original NGOs remain as owners of the equity or become 
major investors. In some cases these NGOs are required by law to continue as 
operating entities. 
 
Usually, for the rest of the initial bank capital, if needed, NGOs come up with a 
market-oriented investment strategy. In this respect its role is two fold: to ensure 
that investors with social and transformational orientation are invited as 
shareholders, and, if legally possible, to provide the best possible positioning for 
the NGO in the shareholders’ structure. It is thought namely, that NGOs should be 
able to ensure that the banks will not drift from the original mission. However, the 
final result is to be negotiated with the prospective investors.  
 
At this stage another issue comes up and is to be clarified - the fate of the NGO 
which will convert into or invest in the future FFI. In many cases that is an issue 
of greatest concern - for the conversion process itself, as well as for the future of 
the bank, especially if the idea of two entities prevails: the bank as for-profit 
entity performing commercial credit and savings operations, and the NGO itself as 
not-for-profit entity, usually supposed to do development work, training and 
research and development for the bank. 
 
The initial proposal has to clear this dilemma. That way, potential investors and/or 
funders would have a choice: to invest in the bank, or to donate to the NGO. 
 
In this respect, there is widespread opinion that the NGO which creates bank 
should not continue to provide lending services. If the parent NGO is to remain 
intact after the bank is launched – it needs a clear, compelling and financially 
sustainable mission.  
 
However, when the NGOs surrender their micro-credit operations to the banks, 
they will not be able to continue generating income through interest and fees, so 
the next question is: how would they cover their costs? 
 
This will have to come partly from their investment earnings (dividends) in the 
banks and partly from pilot projects/activities. As mentioned, the NGOs could also 
provide fee-based advisory services to other players and earn income to support 
their operations. The bulk of the money to be used by the NGOs will continue to 
come from grants. At certain stage, it could also be expected that the banks will 
have special development funds to be channelled through the NGOs for 
community development activities. 
 
On the other hand, if the NGO exists only as pro forma entity (is not engaged in 
any other activity than being simply a shareholder/owner) the issue that arises is 
how to spend dividends if the bank is profitable. This is another hot debate to be 
dealt with. 
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5.1.3. Governance: Dual or Single, Professional or Street-smart? 
 
Any conversion process from an NGO into a bank needs a group of committed 
leaders capable to guide and drive it. The group, usually composed of executive 
level people from the NGO, representatives of the partners/donors and in many 
cases external consultants is supposed to be knowledgeable enough to go through 
successfully, adding high-value in terms of specialized skills, experience and 
connections with investors. In addition to the executive directors, partner 
representatives and external consultants, in most instances one or two board 
members - not being experienced and qualified bankers or professionals but 
knowing the social and legal environment - championed the conversion efforts. In 
any case these key actors should be people with vision and strong management 
and marketing skills. 
 
However, once the conversion process is on, it becomes clear that the flexible 
concept of ownership and governance in NGOs does not comply with the clear 
responsibilities in FFIs. The FFI in formation can readily expect raising standards 
through revised accreditation process and audit function, and external rating 
agency standards, while being in line with both original vision and mission.  
On the other hand, in most cases the NGOs’ boards and management desire to 
remain as some sort of operating entities after the FFI is formed, and that might 
arise as a conflicting issue. 
 
In that respect, if the NGO is not the sole owner of the FFI, newly established 
entity - bank or savings house/bank will have its own independent board 
composed of directors that represent the various investors. Their number will 
usually be in proportion to the size of their respective investment capital. The 
NGOs are to maintain their own boards but will also have representation on the 
banks’ board. While the board of the bank might not have the privilege to directly 
influence or intervene with the affairs of the NGOs, the boards of the NGOs, 
through their representatives, will have full and direct access to the affairs of the 
banks. In many cases that role of the NGOs focuses exclusively on influencing the 
banks’ board to remain on track, i.e. to operate in accordance with the original 
mission. That line and manner of action might differ from the highly specialized, 
profit-minded orientation of the board members representing other investors, and 
that arises as another conflicting issue. Yet, some experienced authors see no 
potential tension here, arguing that whatever the ownership “[it] remains 
intrinsically linked to effective governance, and one cannot assert that any one 
type of owner is more effective in governance than another. The profile of good 
governance is not determined by the type of owner, but rather by the adherence 
to the terms and requirements for all board members” (Otero, 2001: 14). 
 
As for the management, a senior management team needs to be in place from the 
start of the conversion process. In some instances the management team of the 
NGO may not have the right set of skills and experience to successfully manage a 
bank. If this a case, those involved in the designing and executing of the 
conversion process are obliged to initiate personnel changes upfront in order to 
ensure the success of the bank. By recognizing this and taking the necessary 
steps, vision and courage to fulfil the mission will be demonstrated from the very 
start of the process. 
 
When run by two different sets of boards and management, the risk that the two 
entities will gradually drift and distance from each other has to be well anticipated. 
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One standard way of preventing such outcome is through enhanced relationship 
at senior level. At board level, this is done through NGO board representation on 
the bank board. The executive teams of the banks and NGOs should also institute 
a good governance principles and a procedure whereby they meet regularly and 
interact on program and organizational issues. This will not only help them to 
share up to date information but also to keep their coherence and ensure that the 
joint mission is promoted and maintained. As with every complementary process, 
transparency is a must. 
 
 
5.1.4. Staff and Client Transition  
 
Staff transition and its ideological and psychological barriers might be potentially 
hot issue, as well. While emphasis has been put on commitment to improve social 
welfare of the poor for years, the new reality asks for replacement with the logic 
of profitability. That is not easy to be achieved and therefore, training of 
personnel is crucial, altogether with balanced approach in engaging both 
employees of the NGO and new people from the banking sector.  
 
On the other hand, the common perception is that banks pay more than NGOs 
and that bank employees are more credible and better treated. The NGO 
personnel are likely to embrace this kind of perception and even might see it 
happening in the form of differences in salaries, training opportunities, uniforms, 
bonuses, international travels, etc. There is also the sense that the banks will be a 
more secure place of employment as they will be earning their own income. This 
scenario might motivate staff to leave the NGOs and join the banks and when 
such opportunities are not available to join other organizations. 
 
It will, therefore, be important that there is a proper plan for staff movements 
between the banks and NGOs and for developing fair compensation packages to 
avoid frustrations. It is important to train the staff of the banks and prepare them 
to do their new duties well. It is equally important to train the staff of the NGOs to 
adjust to the new roles. Appreciating and treating staff in both entities equally will, 
most of all help to stop them from leaving both the NGOs and FFIs. 
 
What happens with the economic, spiritual, social and personal transformation in 
clients’ lives is the next question, since the client transition issue deserves its own 
attention. The normal reporting system of the FFI focuses on financial indicators 
only. Yet, there is still no unique formula presented on how to encourage FFIs to 
innovate and develop new financial products that serve their clients’ needs, while 
maintaining quality control and making sure that they are to remain focused on 
serving the very poor and achieving a transformational impact. 
 
It is important, therefore, what the clients are going to be told about the 
objectives of the conversion. As many of the poor are logically suspicious by even 
the simple mentioning of profitability, the well-thought explanation could include 
new client benefits such as permanent source of funds for loans, access to a 
variety of financial services and improvement of the quality of services. 
 
Furthermore, although not debated very much in the literature on conversion, the 
interest rate policy might be of crucial importance for the successful 
commencement of bank operations. Expectedly, it would cover all costs and make 
a reasonable profit. However, the overall impact for the MFIs becoming banks is 
the necessity for raising their interest rates, which is not always the case.  
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The problem arises when it will be found out as unavoidable that the microfinance 
bank’s interest rates are to be higher than other commercial banks. Of course, it 
is justified in higher costs of microfinance operations, payment of commercial 
rates for money borrowed as opposed to cost-free funds received by the NGO etc. 
However, it is not something that long term clients want to hear. On the other 
side, Central Bank insists on profitability and is generally suspicious about the 
small-amount loans, non-traditional methods of providing collateral through 
solidarity groups and non-conventional clientele. Beside the microfinance mantra 
that the access to credit is more important than interest rate, this kind of dual 
pressure upon the newly established FFI makes it a key issue in the debates 
related to the very essence of the sense for conversion. 
 
 
5.1.5. Mission and Values Drift 
 
Traditional vision, mission and values challenge versus the forthcoming 
commercial pressure has been among the strongest points of argumentation of 
those questioning the conversion. “Whether the opening of a regulatory 
framework leads to the development of a microfinance industry, or whether it is 
the visionary and competent microfinance NGOs that lead the way, operating as 
regulated entities will inevitably sharpen the microfinance institutions’ focus on 
financial performance and, ultimately, make them more commercial in their 
outlook” says Christen (2002: 7), that way raising the dilemmas about FFIs’ 
extent of the commitment to the original vision, mission and strategy and how 
much they remain strong. As said, namely, it is possible the mission to erode by 
commercial pressures. 
 
However, once put in relationship, the NGOs and FFIs exist and operate as 
individual and independent entities under different government regulations. The 
real challenge is how to keep cohesion to ensure that they do not drift from each 
other at the cost of the original vision and mission. 
 
This will partly depend on the roles the two come to play. It is necessary therefore, 
to come back with the question: what did bring the NGOs into existence and what 
motivates them to keep on? 
 
It is well known that NGOs came into existence in order to fight material poverty 
by helping the poor through provision of microfinance services, including 
information, awareness raising, training and organization. So, the vision, mission, 
core values, activities and resources of the NGOs evolve around these core goals: 
empowerment, character and service. These are long-term in nature and the 
NGOs wish to keep on operating as long as the problems exist. Outreach, 
transformation and sustainability became key factors in the process. 
 
The desire was to serve as many poor men and women as possible on a 
transformational and sustainable basis. Greater outreach requires more capital. 
The mobilization and management of large capital in turn, require a new set of 
organizational structure and a more complex management. Herein is the rationale 
for the birth of FFIs. They were brought into existence in order to promote 
empowerment among more poor people through the provision of more and better 
services, based on mobilizing more capital in a more formal way, including the 
savings from the public and investment from the private sector, which couldn’t 
have been done under NGO status. Again, the management of large amounts of 
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capital (deposits and loans) requires a more complex set of expertise and 
technology. 
 
It is essential therefore that the FFIs are seen as financial arms of the NGOs 
creatively innovated in response to new growth needs and requirements. If not 
jeopardized, their basic vision, mission and core values should remain the same 
as those of the NGOs. Simply, from the perspective of NGO’s vision, mission and 
values, the FFIs are to be seen as means in transforming client’s lives, not an end 
in themselves. In that sense, although “the combination of the term 
transformation and the term financial institution does not seem, at first, to be a 
logical one”, comments Reed (2004: online), “as we shift from the more 
traditional NGO-style organizations to formal financial institutions, we maintain 
the focus on the fundamental economic, social, and spiritual wellbeing of our 
clients”. 
 
 
5.2. Lessons Learned 
 
Debates regarding MFI conversion might be coated with optimism or scepticism, 
approval or denial, but once the decision is made, as Campion notes (2004: 
online), there is “no turning back” - the new entity is to be “permanently linked to 
formal financial system”. It is therefore wise to consume the lessons learned by 
those that have already taken the step. 
 
 
5.2.1. Achieve Full Sustainability 
 
Crucial precondition to any idea of conversion into a bank is the NGO not to 
consider starting the process unless and until they are, as wisely called - 
graduated, i.e. fully financially sustainable. 
 
As said, microfinance can attain wide outreach only outside the subsidized credit 
model, in self-sufficient commercial institutions. MFIs historically raise their 
interest rates to attain sustainable levels, but cost effectiveness must also be 
addressed. Therefore, in progressing through the levels of sustainability, any MFI 
must first show operational sustainability, then accomplishing financial 
sustainability, then starting to work on conversion process. 
 
  
5.2.2. Double Check the Regulatory Framework 
 
Formal financial institutions are subject to regulations and policies established by 
the Central Bank in their respective country. It is expected that NGOs intending to 
convert into FFIs should comply with all Central Bank regulations and reporting 
requirements in their country.  
 
Although there is an increasing trend of harmonization of the banking legislation 
worldwide, there are still number of conflicting regulatory frameworks among 
various countries, as well as between the policies and standards of the global 
microfinance coalitions and regulatory requirements in a specific country. 
Therefore, it is essential such differences to be anticipated and addressed in 
advance.  
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5.2.3. Consider Ownership 
 
As the most of the existing MFIs have been established with the generous grants 
by various charitable organizations or by the technical donations of various public 
entities from the developed countries, resolving the issue of FFIs’ ownership 
becomes crucial point of conversion.  
 
The sharing of ownership could already be perceived as both a liability and an 
asset. A liability, because the NGOs would have ideally liked to own the bank 
themselves while outside investors could have different intentions. An asset, 
because the risk is shared, more knowledge is made available and the NGOs could 
use part of their capital for other purposes. 
 
New investors have to believe in both profitability and social merit, i.e. market 
driven micro-finance program that will reach the poor as declared. Therefore, it is 
necessary to be careful in selecting investors, so to meet their expectations. Plus, 
their credibility is of importance for the Central Bank.  
 
 
5.2.4. Distinct Roles and Functions 
 
As pointed out above, if the two entities - NGO and FFI remain in existence they 
should not do things that are competitive or undermining one entity by the other. 
Efforts should be done to avoid overlapping in any areas. Roles, functions and 
activities should be distinct and complementary at the same time. Staff, directors 
and clients should know who does what and where to go for what. The creation of 
such clarity among clients is very important, more so because they are likely to 
be easily confused and not always able to understand. They should have 
confidence in the new entity, the bank. Clarifying the various roles and functions 
is one way of establishing that. 
 
However, NGOs which create banks should not continue to provide lending 
services. If the parent NGO is to remain intact after the bank is launched – it 
needs a clear, compelling and financially sustainable mission. 
 
 
5.2.5. Ensure Culture Change 
 
For decades NGOs as microfinance providers have been well known by their 
informal culture, including the flexible roles of the management and the staff. 
They have been often characterized as entities of “family” culture where everyone 
knows everyone else, that way building the relationships of trust rather than 
relationships based on clear procedures. 
 
FFIs need clearly defined roles and responsibilities, more formal systems, more 
formal controls and professional expertise. Therefore, different behaviour and 
culture is required by all: directors, managers and the staff. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
Based on what has been offered in the previous sections of this paper, both as 
theoretical and empirical argumentation, it is hard to deny that NGOs conversion 
into FFIs has positive impact on what has been drafted as general objective of the 
microfinance industry for the next decade. As a matter of fact, there are still 
views that “this development in the NGO micro-credit sub-sector is ironic because 
NGOs began micro-credit provision initially because of the failure of RFIs, 
commercial banks in particular, to serve the poor and low-income households” 
(Fernando, 2003: 2), but this kind of divisions, among other into institutionists 
and welfarists (see Woller, Dunford and Woodworth, 1999) seem to be completely 
outdated. 
 
Yet, what is seen after examining the nine OI partners is some sort of competition 
among institutions. Generally, as everywhere else, competition is seen as good for 
the consumer - competition in industry has improved service quality, driven 
innovations, and brought about new ways of doing things.  
 
In that sense, the performances indicated in the previous sections of this paper 
show that in many cases there is no compulsory relationship between MFI's 
success, as broadly understood notion, and its formal/informal status. Measurable 
by performance indicators available, within the nine MFIs examined in this paper 
there are examples of successful NGOs, co-operative, savings houses/banks and a 
full service bank. On the other side, although a very exact activity, provision of 
microfinance services might be never successful enough for the ultimate goal of 
the whole concept which is to eradicate poverty over the globe. In that respect, it 
is not easy to determine how much the conversion itself contributed to the level of 
particular success. Namely, some political and economic developments in 
particular countries influence the success. Specific regulator's requirements have 
their own influence, therefore making the skilfulness and wisdom - by which the 
conversion process is guided - to be important but not the decisive factor. 
 
The number of clients served seems to be the most useful indicator for the 
purpose of illustration of this dilemma. Eight of nine of the examined MFIs, both 
regulated and unregulated, have continuous increase of this parameter. Even 
more, the highest rate (48%) of client growth in 2004 has been performed by a 
finance company (PShM - Albania), while both a full service bank (OBM - 
Montenegro) and the only NGO in this group of nine (FORA - Russia) in the same 
period accomplished similar client growth of 28-29%. These findings therefore 
make this indicator not very relevant to the subject of this research. 
 
Additional indicator of the success of the MFI is the increase of the portfolio. As 
with the client outreach indicators, the willingness of the investors, including 
those with social motivation, is highly dependent not only on the institutional 
status of the MFI, but also on the political and economic situation in the particular 
country. In that sense, decrease in performance figures sometimes has been 
caused by wider economic or political crisis, unfair competition, organizational 
weakness, changes in the management etc. rather than the poor performance of 
the MFI caused by its regulated/unregulated status. 
 
In the similar manner, increase in performance figures sometimes has been 
caused by external factors (new grant, if portfolio is concerned), rather than the 
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excellence in performance. Implementation of complementary step (increase of 
the number of clients as a consequence of downgrading the average loan size) 
might also lead to misleading conclusions. 
 
In that sense, if the need for strong performance is taken as crucial reason for 
conversion, Russian FORA denies that stand also in another area - loan portfolio 
quality: with the number of clients being almost tripled in three years, portfolio in 
arrears more than 1 day (!) has been kept on 0.4%. As said, these results have 
been achieved as an NGO and are the leading ones within the whole OI Network. 
 
Another argumentation in favour of the stand of conditional relevance of the 
formal status for the performance can be found in the two co-operatives’ case: 
current difficulties and modest performance of NOA (Croatia) namely, have little 
to do with their institutional status, but are result of a specific problem with the 
Croatian tax legislation. At the same time, the other co-operative (Nachala - 
Bulgaria) performs very well, attracting continuous grant funding from USAID. 
Nachala namely, was the only one of the microfinance institutions in Bulgaria to 
receive an expansion grant, which is the direct result of an extremely positive and 
complimentary evaluation, conducted by an independent consulting firm engaged 
by USAID. 
 
An interesting characterization, related not only to performance figures but also to 
the governance challenges, applies to Moznosti (Macedonia). Being FFI (savings 
house/bank since 2000) but at the same time being refused upon application for 
full service bank, Moznosti kept excellent performance. Even more, a year after 
refusal, Moznosti has been given highest possible grade for FFI in the country by 
the very same authority (Central Bank). All this happened with exactly the same 
governing board and management that were running Moznosti as NGO. 
 
Polish and Romanian (IM and OMRO) cases, on the other hand, might be good 
examples in supporting the conversion logic. Both non-deposit taking finance 
companies, they are in relative stagnation caused mainly by the lack of funds. 
Although it is said that there are no present plans to convert them into banks, 
their current status might be a good reason to believe that as FFIs they would 
have done much better with the attraction of capital. Certainly, good will for 
conversion cannot be enough as some other open questions are to be analysed 
and solved first: capacity to attract the capital, unfavourable legislation (high level 
of capital required for bank establishment), strong competition on the market, etc. 
 
Finally, the textbook example of the right time decision to convert (right after the 
new banking law has been passed, with the new Montenegrin Central Bank just 
established), altogether with the right method and the right people put in place, 
has been that of the OBM (Montenegro). It is a case that justifies all previously 
listed objectives of the conversion. OBM’s results to date, namely, offer a 
dramatic example of the potential scope and scale of outreach and coverage if 
microfinance is done in a sustainable manner through a commercial bank. Even 
more, fears that a commitment to sustainability (profit) virtually guarantees that 
an MFI will move up market, abandoning poorer clients, in this case have 
appeared ungrounded. In fact, contrary to the critics of commercialization who 
frequently note that the average loan size of commercialized microfinance 
institutions is significantly higher than that of non-profit MFIs, OBM’s figure raised 
reasonably, at the end of 2004 being at an acceptable (for European standards) 
level of 4,486 USD.  
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This does not mean again, that the success of OBM is a direct consequence of the 
conversion itself. As argued in various sections of this paper, conversion is doing a 
lot but not doing it all. In that sense, this paper does not suggest to “disregard 
[the] microfinance evangelists proselytizing one way of doing business” 
(Rosengard, 2000: 9). What this paper is advocating for is to be careful with the 
expectations from the conversion itself. It is not a panacea. Competition among 
institutions and “one size does not fit all” logic will sustain for at least some time 
in the future, and if regulated microfinance institutions are not going to be 
regarded as an end in themselves, they are now in the best position to prove their 
advantages. 
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i Client numbers are 2002; all financials are 2002, except PAR which is 2003 Q2 
ii Average NGO’s in Latin America; does not include African partners 
iii Average ACCION Network 
iv Client Numbers are end of Q3, 2003 
v Client numbers are from Q2, 2002; financials are Q3 2001 
vi Client numbers and financials are Q2, 2002 
vii Client numbers and financials are Q2, 2001 
viii WWB has several client categories and different types of credit services.  Total outreach is over 12 million 
people.  Client numbers and financials are Q3 2002 
ix Client numbers and financials are Q2, 2001 
x Client and financials are from Q2, 2002 
